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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal is from two cases that were consolidated on 
appeal, one a guardianship proceeding and the other a probate 
proceeding, for trial of issues determinative of the validity of 
a will executed November 28, 1977 by Grace M. Anderson, deceased. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
After trial on the merits to the court, the court, 
Honorable J. Duffy Palmer, entered its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Order, Judgment, and Decree declaring the 
validity of the will of November 28, 1977, of Grace M. Anderson 
and admitting said will to probate. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Affirrnance of the decision below. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Inasmuch as the sole issue raised on appeal is whether 
the trial court erred in not holding itself bound by the prior 
order of Judge Swan (G., pp. 98-101), the pertinent facts are as 
follows: 
1. Two cases were consolidated for trial in the court 
below. (R., p. 228) One was a Guardianship proceeding, Probate 
No. 1-3347 and the other a Probate proceeding, Probate No~ 2827° 
' . 
-1-
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(The record in the Guardianship proceeding is denoted by the 
letter "G" and a page number; in the Probate proceeding by the 
letter "R" and a page number.} 
2. Grace M. Anderson executed a will on November 28, 
1977. ·That will was declared valid and admitted to probate by the 
trial court. (R., p. 251-52, Findings of Fact No. I) 
3. On or about the 17th day of May, 1977, Lois Jean 
Osborn petitioned the court in the Guardianship proceeding for the 
removal of Kenneth O. Smith as guardian for Grace M. Ander·son, an 
aged person, and for the substi tu ti on of herself. (G., p. 30, R., 
p. 252) 
I 
I 
4. Kenneth O. Smith and Lois Jean Osborn agreed that 
that issue would be resolved by the wishes of Grace M. Anderson. 
(R., p. 252) 
5. Grace M. Anderson chose Lois Jean Osborn to be 
guardian. 
6. Gerald Hess, Smith's attorney, prepared a stipulation 
to the change of guardian, which was executed by Kenneth O. Smith 
and Lois Jean Osborn on or abot;t July 30, 1977. (G., p. 50; R., p. 
25 2) 
7. On or about August 11, 1977, the Court issued an 
order incorporating the terms of the stipulation. (G., p. 54; R., 
p. 252) 
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8. On or about August 11, 1977, Lois Jean Osborn was 
appointed conservator for Grace M. Anderson, an aged person. {G., 
p. 62: R., p. 252) 
9. The actual purpose of the stipulation and Court Order 
referred to above was to satisfy Kenneth O. Smith's desire to 
receive notice of any subsequent wills or deeds of Grace M. 
Anderson rather than to raise any question regarding the 
competency of Grace M. Anderson to execute such documents. 
(R., p. 252) 
10. On or about February 14, 1978, Kenneth o. Smith 
petitioned the court in the Guardianship proceeding to set aside 
the will of November 28, 1977, and two deeds that had also been 
, 
executed by Grace M. Anderson on that date, because there had been 
no prior court approval. (G. , p. 63 ; R. , p. 253) 
11. David B. Boyce, attorney for the proponent, Lois 
Jean Osborn, had intended to present the deeds and will of 
November 28, 1977, to the court for approval but such had not been 
done prior to February 14, 1978. (G., p. 63; R., p. 253) 
12. Because there had not been prior court approval and 
with the understanding that a hearing would eventually be held to 
determine the competency of Grace M. Anderson to execute the deeds 
and will of November 28, 1977, or any other such documents, 
counsel for the proponent, Lois Jean Osborn, entered into a 
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Stipuulation that resulted in the Court Order that they were void. 
( G " , pp • 7 3 , 9 8 ; R • , p • 2 5 3 ) 
13. On April 27, 1978, Lois Jean Osborn filed a petition 
with the court to have the court determine the competency of Grace 
M. Anderson to have executed the deeds and will of November 28, 
1977, or any other such documents, praying that "an order be 
entered approving testirnentary [sic] devises executed by Grace M. 
Anderson and giving her the right to execute trusts, testirnentary 
[sic] devices, deeds or similar instruments in the future without 
further Court approval." (G., pp. 81-82, R., p. 253}. 
14" A demand for jury trial was made by Petitioner 
Osborn on September 27, 1978. {G., p. 87) 
/ 
15. On October 12, 1978, Judge Swan ordered the issues 
raised by the Petition to be assigned to the trial calendar. 
(G., p. 94) 
16. On October 18, 1978, Judge- Swan entered his written 
order voiding the 1977 will (G., pp. 98-101), and in that same 
order included a provision ordering Objectors to answer the 
Petition and ordering the case to be set for pretrial (' 4, G., 
.p. 99). 
17. Judge Swan's order voiding the Grace M. Anderson 
will of November 28, 1977, was issued summarily, upon stipulation, 
-4-
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and in the absence of any prior hearing as to the competency of 
Grace M. Anderson. (G., pp. 73, 100; R., p. 253) 
18. Appellants herein, who were Objectors in the 
Guardianship proceedings, answered the Petition (G. pp. 102-06), 
alleging the evil designs of Mrs. Osborn and the incompetency of 
Grace, and praying for a hearing on the matters raised in the 
Petition (G. p. 105). 
19. The case was set for trial on April 11, 1979 (G., 
p. 138); Grace died without trial having be held. (R., p. 253) 
20. Trial was had on the Petition on September 28 and 
29, 1981. (R., p. 251) 
I 
I 
ARGUMENT 
Appellants_' arguments, boiled down, are that Judge Swan's 
order of October 18, 1978 (G., pp. 98-101), voiding the Grace 
Anderson will of November 28, 1977, was a final determination 
which as a matter of law prevents that will from being admitted to 
probate. The appeal must fail for several reasons. 
I. THE APPEAL MUST FAIL BECAUSE IT RESTS UPON THE 
ASSERTED INVALIDITY OF CERTAIN FINDINGS OF FACT, 
WHICH ARE UNASSAILABLE ON APPEAL. 
Appellants' Points I and II argue the inaccuracy of 
the trial court's Findings of Facts Nos. II(j) and II(n), in which 
the court found that Judge. Swan's order was based upon 
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stipulation, which was entered into with the understanding that a 
hearing would eventually be held on Grace Anderson's competency 
(R., p. 253). Appellants also argue in Point II of their Brief 
that Finding II(g) is contrary to the evidence. 
Appellants cannot attack these Findings of Fact, or any 
other for that matter, because this Court does not have before it 
the transcript of the evidence offered from which these Findings 
are drawn. McDonald v. Shaw, 581 P.2d 1016, 1018 {Utah 1978) 
("The findings of fact are unassailable where there is no 
transcript for us to consider."). The transcript of the pre-trial 
motion hearing does not suffice; evidence was offered at trial by 
competent witnesses as to the circumstances giving rise to Judge 
I 
I 
Swan's order, and the underlying stipulation, and without the 
transcript of that testimony before it, this Court cannot review 
those findings. 
II. THE APPEAL MUST FAIL BECAUSE JUDGE SWAN'S ORDER WAS 
AN INTERIM ORDER SUBJECT TO FURTHER REVIEW AT A 
TRIAL ON THE COMPETENCY OF GRACE M. ANDERSON. 
The Guardianship proceedings concerning Grace M. 
Anderson, Probate No. 1-3347, were headed for a trial on the 
merits when Grace died. On February 14, 1978, the parties 
appeared before Judge Swan and stipulated to an order voiding 
Grace Anderson's will of November 28, 1977 (G., p. 73). Two 
months later, on April 28, 1978, Lois Jean Osborn filed a Petition 
-6-
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praying that "an order be entered approving testirnentary [sic) 
devises executed by Grace M. Anderson and giving her the right 
to execute trusts, testimentary [sic] devices, deeds or similar 
instruments in the future without further Court approval." 
(G., pp. 81-82). A demand for jury trial was made by Petitioner 
Osborn (G., p. 87) on September 27, 1978. On October 18, 1978, 
Judge Swan entered his written order voiding the 1977 will 
(G., pp. 98-101), and in that same order included a provision 
ordering Objectors to answer the Petition and ordering the case 
to be set for pretrial (~ 4, G., p. 99). Thus Judge Swan 
contemplated a trial on the issue of the validity of Grace's 1977 
will as set forth in the Petition at the very time he entered his 
I 
order voiding the will. Indeed, Judge Swan just six days prior to 
entry of his written order voiding the will, had ordered the 
issues raised by the Petition to be assigned to the trial calendar 
(G., p. 94). Appellants herein, who were Objectors in the 
Guardianship proceedings, answered the Petition (Go PP~ 102-06), 
alleging the evil designs of Mrs. Osborn and the incompetency of 
Grace, and praying for a hearing on the matters raised in the 
Petition (G. p. 105). The case was set for trial on April 11, 
1977 (G., p. 138) ; Grace died before trial could be heldo 
What would have been determined at the trial in Probate 
No. 1-3347 if it had gone to trial: Whether Grace M. Anderson 
lacked capacity to make her will of November 28, 1977, and whether 
-7-
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she was unduly influenced by Lois Jean Osborn. And if the answer 
to those issues was no, then the court would have entered an order 
approving Grace's will of November 28, 1977. Otherwise, the 
Petition and Answer, the court's setting the case for trial, and 
the holding of a trial would all have been nonsense. 
Actually, a trial was held in Probate No. 1-3347. The 
case was consolidated for trial (R., p. 228) with Probate No~ 
2827, in which Grace's will of November 28, 1977, was sought to be 
admitted to probate, and tried to the court on September 28 and 
29, 1981, Judge Palmer presiding (Judge Swan having retired). At 
the trial, the very issues raised by the Petition of Mrs. Osborn 
and ordered to be tried in Probate No. 1-3347 were tried and 
I 
I 
resolvedi and an order entered approving Grace's will of 
November 28, 1977. (R., pp. 256-58) 
Thus Appellant's appeal is groundless in the face of the 
undisputed scenario of these cases. The- order of Judge Swan was 
an interim order, the subject matter of which had already been set 
for trial on the merits. It was entered upon stipulation, 
summarily, without any hearing or the taking of any evidence. It 
was vacated in the same case in which it was entered, after a 
trial on the merits, by a Judge who replaced the previous Judge 
upon the latter's retirement. Thus Judge Swan's interim order was 
in no way dispositive of the validity of Grace's will of November 
28, 1977, and Objectors' motion to dismiss the probate petition 
was properly denied. 
-8-
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III. THE APPEAL MUST FAIL BECAUSE JUDGE SWAN'S ORDER DID 
NOT BAR THE LITIGATION OF THE ISSUE OF THE VALIDITY 
OF GRACE M. ANDERSON'S WILL OF NOVEMBER 28, 1977 BY 
RES JUDICATA OR COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL. 
The doctrines of res judicata and collateral 
estoppel are wholly inapplicable to the case for a few fundamental 
reasons. First, there is lacking a final judgment in one case 
disposing of a matter sought to be litigated in a subsequent 
case. See, e.g., Re West Jordan, Inc., 7 Utah 2d 391, 326 P.2d 
105 (1958). Judge Swan's order was not and did not become a final 
judgment, and preliminary or interim rulings do not ·rise to the 
dignity of res judicata. Richardson v. Grand Central Corporation, 
I 
572 P.2d 395, 397 (Utah 1977) Cl 
Second, there was no litigation of an issue in one case 
later sought to be relitigated in another case. See, e.g., Re 
West Jordan, Inc., supra; Matthews v. Matthews, 102 Utah 428, 132 
P.2d 111 (1942); 46 Am. Jur. 2d, Judgments § 395. Certainly Judge 
Swan's order did not come about as a result of a hearing or trial 
in which issues were litigated. His order was based upon 
stipulation, which was entered into with the understanding that a 
hearing would later be held; it was a summary order and was 
entered without benefit of a hearing. (Findings of Fact II(j) and 
(n), R., p. 253) As noted by this Court in Re West Jordan, Inc., 
supra, the doctrine of collateral estoppel 
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only applies where a question of fact essential 
to and determinative of the judgment is actually 
litigated and determined by a valid or final 
judgment • . . GI 
7 Utah 2d at 394. 
Third, Judge Swan's order was not reviewed in a 
subsequent or different action. It was subjected to trial on the 
merits in the same case in which it was issued, Probate No. 
1-3347. Thus there can be no question of the effect of Judge 
Swan's order upon the issues in Probate No. 2827, because Probate 
No. 1-3347 was consolidated with it for trial, and Judge Swan's 
order was thus superseded by a decision on the merits in the very 
case in which it was originally entered. 
; As a result, Appellants' arguments regarding collateral 
estoppel and res judicata are inapposite and should be wholly 
disregarded by the Court. 
IV. THE APPEAL MUST FAIL BECAUSE JUDGE PALMER ACTED 
WITHIN HIS AUTHORITY IN VACATING JUDGE SWAN'S 
INTERIM ORDER AFTER TRIAL ON THE MERITS. 
Appellants cite the general rule that a judge of one 
division of the same court cannot act as an appellate court and 
overrule orders, judgments, or decrees of another judge. 
(Appellants' Brief, p. 14) The Appellants' argument is 
misdirected for a number of reasons. First, the rule is not 
applicable in this instance because Judge Palmer did not review 
-10-
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Judge Swan's order as an appellate court and overrule it. He sat 
as a trial judge on the merits of a controversy as to which Judge 
Swan made an interim ruling that contemplated a trial on the 
merits of the case, the foreseeable result of which might be the 
vacating of the interim order. In that sense, the interim order 
of Judge Swan was like a preliminary injunction, an order that is 
not binding on the trial court (nor are the findings and 
conclusions supporting it) when the case in which it is entered 
comes to trial on the merits. E.g., Berrigan v. Sigler, 499 F.2d 
514 (D.C. Cir. 1974). If Judge Swan's order had been the ultimate 
determination of the issue of the validity of Gr~ce's 1977 will, 
then Appellants would have objected to a trial in Pr.abate No. 
I 
I 
1-3347 or Judge Swan would not have set the matter for trial. 
Neither occurred, of course, and trial was had in that case and 
the issues hearing upon the validity of that will were finally 
litigated. 
Second, Judge Palmer did not overrule another judge's 
order, in practical effect. If Judge Swan had not retired, he 
would have tried the issues and would have made his rulings as to 
the validity of the will, thus either upholding, modifying, or 
vacating his interim order. Since he retired, another judge 
stepped into his shoes and heard the case. 
Third, the placement of the case on the trial calendar 
for trial of the issues be?ring upon the validity of Grace's 1977 
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will gave the trial court jurisdiction to determine those issues 
and make appropriate rulings to carry them out. See In re Estate 
of Mecham, 537 P.2d 312 (Utah 1975), wherein this Court upheld the 
authority of the law and motion judge to vacate the order of 
another judge who had said that the matter should be referred to 
the law and motion division. In so doing, this Court held: 
While in normal procedure and protocol this 
motion would have come up before Judge Jeppson, 
when he directed that it be placed on the 
general law and motion calendar, any judge of 
the court had jurisdiction to act in the matter. 
Id. at 314. Similarly, in the case at bar, Judge Palmer, sitting 
as the trial judge at the trial directed to be held by Judge Swan, 
had authority to act in- the matter. 
, 
I 
I 
·Fourth, the general rule cited by Appellants is not 
categorical. In In re Estate of Mecham, supra, this Court stated 
the rule as follows and then commented: 
We have no doubt about the rule-, applicable 
under proper circumstances, that a judge of one 
division of the same court cannot act as an 
appellate court and overrule another such judge 
• • • • 
[W]e note that though this is usually 
stated to be the general rule, it should also be 
appreciated that it may depend upon the 
circumstances and the justice of the case, see 
Annotation, 20 A.L.R. Fed. 13, at p. 17, which 
states that the rule is sometimes considered to 
be absolute, but" ..• the modern trend appears 
to regard the rule as one of restraint on the 
exercise of judicial discretion, ••• " 
-12-
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537 P.2d 314 & n. 2. Given the circumstances of Judge Swan's 
order based upon stipulation of the parties, with a further 
hearing contemplated, summarily entered without benefit of 
evidence or hearing, and the case being previously set by 
Judge Swan for trial on the very issues dealt with in the order, 
without objection of the Appellants -- Judge Palmer appropriately 
exercised his discretion to resolve the issues on the merits. 
Fifth, the general rule does not apply where the second 
judge considers the same question of law previously ruled upon, 
i.e., the legal validity of Grace's 1977 will, in connection with 
a subsequent motion in which the question of law is properly 
involved and the subsequent motion presents the cas~ in a 
I 
different light. Richardson v. Grand Central Corporation, 572 
P.2d 395 (Utah 1977). Although the rule is stated as to motions, 
it applies with even more force to a trial of the merits of the 
case. Following the entry of Judge Swan's order, and the setting 
of the case for trial, the parties conducted discovery, arranged 
for Grace's examination by psychiatrists, and prepared for trial 
upon the merits of the issues that would determine the validity of 
Grace's 1977 will -- her capacity to make a will and the question 
of undue influence. When the issues were presented to Judge 
Palmer, all such evidence was available and was presented to him 
in orderly fashion, along with evidence of the circumstances 
surrounding the issuance o~ Judge Swan's orders, and in light of 
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the new evidence and the full development of the case, he was 
entitled to review Judge Swan's order and rule upon the issues 
ordered to trial by Judge. 
Sixth, the general rule is not applicable where the 
prior judge is unavailable to review his original ordero See 
Annotat·ion, 20 A.L.R. Fed 13, § 6 and cases cited therein. Since 
Judge Swan was not available to hear the case and determine the 
effect of the evidence at trial upon his earlier order, the 
general rule does not apply. 
For all of these reasons, Judge Palmer acted properly in 
entering his Findings and Conclusions and Order as he did. 
CONCLUSION 
. / 
·Respondent respectfully requests the Court to affirm the 
decision of the court below. 
DATED this~day of March, 1982. 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
At orneys for Respondent 
Lois Jean Osborn 
400 Deseret Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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